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Abstract: Relaying is one of the useful techniques to enhance wireless physical-layer security.
Existing literature shows that employing full-duplex relay instead of conventional half-duplex
relay improves secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability, but this is at the price of sophisticated
implementation. As an alternative, two-path successive relaying has been proposed to emulate
operation of full-duplex relay by scheduling a pair of half-duplex relays to assist the source
transmission alternately. However, the performance of two-path successive relaying in secrecy
communication remains unexplored. This paper proposes a secrecy two-path successive relaying
protocol for a scenario with one source, one destination and two half-duplex relays. The relays operate
alternately in a time division mode to forward messages continuously from source to destination in
the presence of an eavesdropper. Analytical results reveal that the use of two half-duplex relays in
the proposed scheme contributes towards a quadratically lower probability of interception compared
to full-duplex relaying. Numerical simulations show that the proposed protocol achieves the ergodic
achievable secrecy rate of full-duplex relaying while delivering the lowest probability of interception
and secrecy outage probability compared to the existing half duplex relaying, full duplex relaying
and full duplex jamming schemes.
Keywords: wireless sensor network; 5G; physical layer secrecy; cooperative relay networks; two-path
successive relaying; secrecy capacity; intercept probability; secrecy outage probability
1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) is a rapidly emerging field and is driven by a wealth of research.
In the WSN, sensor nodes collect and process environmental information. Then, the sensor nodes
transmit sensed information to a base station. However, data rate of the transmission is limited at
low power sensor nodes for a longer battery lifetime. Relaying is a significant technique to increase
the data rate for WSN under the power constraint [1–3]. Idle sensor nodes with no information to
transmit can assist the network by performing as relay nodes. However, the sensor nodes must able to
communicate with others sensor nodes. The fifth generation (5G) wireless network, which supports
device-to-device communication, will address the demand of inter-sensor communication [4].
Following the broadcast nature of wireless channels, transmission between sensor nodes and base
station can be easily overheard and possibly extracted by an eavesdropper. This makes WSN highly
susceptible to eavesdropping. In order to achieve a confidential and secure wireless communication,
existing systems rely on cryptographic techniques at upper layers [5,6]. However, the cryptographic
techniques such as encryption rely on the assumption that the eavesdropper has limited computational
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capability and is therefore not likely to decipher the key in finite time. Recently, physical layer security
has been identified as a promising strategy to provide additional protection against eavesdropping.
Unlike the cryptographic techniques, physical layer security techniques do not rely on
computational complexity and will not be compromised by eavesdropper with powerful computational
capability. Physical layer security uses wiretap channel coding to achieve the information-theoretic
perfect secrecy, where the eavesdropper gains no information about the legitimate information [7–10].
Physical-layer security exploits the characteristics of the wireless channel to improve transmission
security. The secrecy of wireless transmission can be quantified by the secrecy capacity, which is defined
as the maximum secrecy rate which can be conveyed to legitimate receiver while the eavesdropper
gaining no information about the secrecy message [11]. On the other hand, an intercept event occurs
and transmission becomes insecure when the secrecy rate falls below zero. The transmission with
lower probability of occurrence of an intercept event, i.e., intercept probability, is more secure and
robust against eavesdropping. However, the achievable secrecy rate and intercept probability are
severely degraded due to the fading effect of wireless communication. To overcome this limitation,
extra cooperative node can be used to improve the secrecy [12,13].
A cooperative node injecting jamming signal to interfere the eavesdropper can improve the
secrecy rate. However, the jamming signal may deteriorate the desired legitimate transmission as well.
This can be avoided by performing beamforming to minimize the adverse effect of the jamming signal
towards the desired data transmission [14]. As a result, the jamming signal consumes additional power
resource and the design of beamformer increases the complexity. On the other hand, the cooperative
relaying has been identified as a promising technique which not only improves reliability and data
rate but also can be further utilized to ensure the secrecy of wireless transmission [15–20].
Conventionally, a half-duplex relay cannot perform simultaneous transmission and reception
of signal within the same frequency channel. Therefore, when the half-duplex relay is transmitting
a signal, the source has to stop transmission. As a result, the spectral efficiency of conventional
half-duplex relay is at most half of the spectral efficiency of direct transmission. In order to
improve the spectral efficiency of cooperative relaying transmission, a full-duplex relay which can
perform simultaneous transmission and reception in the same frequency channel has been proposed.
However, in practice, the transmission of the full-duplex relay is interfering its own reception. This
self-interference is the main detrimental factor in full-duplex relaying. Since the transmit and receive
antennas of full-duplex relay are co-located, the self-interference is much stronger (i.e., 99 dB as reported
in [21]) than the intended received signal. The self-interference saturates the analog-to-digital converter
(ADC) at the receiver and making it challenging for the cancellation of known self-interference. The
suppression of self-interference requires sophisticated hardware and/or advanced signal processing
which significantly increase the cost and complexity of relays [22–24]. In fact, for full-duplex relaying,
the combination of propagation domain, analog domain and digital domain cancellation techniques
are needed to achieve good suppression of self interference [25,26]. In [27], full-duplex and full-duplex
jamming secrecy network are proposed. Full-duplex relay improves achievable secrecy rate and
secrecy outage probability by providing higher spectral efficiency than conventional half-duplex relay.
In full-duplex jamming secrecy network, the full-duplex relay transmits jamming signal towards the
eavesdroppers while concurrently receives source message, in order to achieve lower secrecy outage
probability [27].
Compared to full-duplex relay, the implementation of a half-duplex relay is much simpler
and cheaper. Two-path successive relaying (TPSR) has been proposed as an alternative to achieve
the full-duplex spectral efficiency by scheduling a pair of half-duplex relays to assist the source
transmission alternately [28]. In TPSR, since the two relays are physically separated, the separation
distance between relays is able to attenuate the inter-relay interference due to the distance path loss
effect. Since the inter-relay interference is much weaker than the self-interference encountered in
full-duplex relay with co-located transmit and receive antennas, simple interference management
techniques, such as treating the interference as noise or successive interference cancellation, is
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effective [29,30]. Existing literature mainly considers the TPSR in conventional scenarios without
eavesdroppers [31–35]. The performance of TPSR in secrecy communication remains unexplored.
In this paper, we propose a secure TPSR protocol that can provide full-duplex spectral efficiency.
Two half-duplex relays are used to forward messages from source to destination alternately, the
source transmits new messages continuously, and full-duplex spectral efficiency can be achieved.
We evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol in terms of ergodic achievable secrecy rate,
intercept probability and secrecy outage probability. The performance is compared with half-duplex
relaying, full-duplex relaying and full-duplex jamming schemes in [27]. We also analyze the intercept
probability of the proposed scheme and full-duplex relaying.
The contributions of this paper are listed as follows. Firstly, we propose secrecy TPSR which is
still unexplored by any existing literature. We evaluate the achievable performance of the proposed
secrecy TPSR in terms of ergodic achievable secrecy rate, intercept probability and secrecy outage
probability. Secondly, we compare the achievable performance of proposed schemes with the existing
half-duplex relaying, full-duplex relaying and full-duplex jamming schemes. Finally, the lower bound
intercept probabilities of proposed scheme and existing full-duplex relaying are derived and verified
with simulations.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the system model and
transmission protocol of TPSR are explained and the intercept probability of TPSR is analyzed in
Section 3. In Section 4, the achievable secrecy rate of comparison schemes are presented. In Section 5,
the numerical simulations are presented to verify the analysis. Finally, the conclusions is given in
Section 6.
2. Secrecy Two-Path Successive Relaying Network
2.1. System Model
Consider a wireless network consisting of a source (S), a destination (D), two half-duplex relays
(R1 and R2) and an eavesdropper (E) as shown in Figure 1, where all nodes are equipped with a single
antenna. The eavesdropper can intercept the transmission from source and relay simultaneously.
R1 and R2 apply the decode-and-forward relaying protocol. It is assumed that the direct S-to-D channel
is not available due to severe path loss and/or shadowing. Therefore, the transmission from S to D
requires the assistance of R1 and R2. In additional, the channel-state-information (CSI) for all channels
(including the eavesdropping channels) are required for wiretap channel coding.
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Figure 1. The secrecy two-path successive relaying (TPSR) network with an eavesdropper.
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We assume that all channels experience block Rayleigh fading (Rayleigh fading represents the
worst case scenario if compared with the case with strong line of sight and path loss. The results
presented in this paper therefore represent the achievable lower bound if compared environment
with strong line of sight) and remain constant over one block but vary independently from one block
to another. The channel coefficient from node i to node j is denoted as hij and channel reciprocity
is assumed, i.e., hij = hji. The corresponding channel gain,
∣∣hij∣∣2 are independently exponentially
distributed with mean of λij. The noise at relays (R1 and R2), D and E are denoted as nr1(t), nr2(t),
nd(t) and ne(t) with variances of σ2r1 , σ
2
r2 , σ
2
d and σ
2
e , respectively. The transmit power of source and
relays are P.
2.2. Transmission Protocol
The transmission protocol of two-path successive relaying (TPSR) is divided into T+ 1 consecutive
equal-duration time-slots where S transmits independent codeword xs(t), t = 1, 2, . . . , T continuously.
The protocol is alternated by odd time-slot stage (to = 1, 3, . . . , T + 1) and even time-slot stage
(te = 2, 4, . . . , T) as shown in Figure 1.
• In odd time-slots, S transmits xs(to) and R2 forwards xs(to − 1). R1 receives xs(to) from S while
being interfered by R2 (inter-relay interference) and D receives xs(to − 1) from R2. E receives both
xs(to) and xs(to − 1) simultaneously.
• In even time-slots, S transmits xs(te) and R1 forwards xs(te − 1). R2 receives xs(te) from S while
being interfered by R1 (inter-relay interference) and D receives xs(te − 1) from R1. E receives both
xs(te) and xs(te − 1) simultaneously.
In odd or even time-slot, the eavesdropper jointly decodes messages from the source and relay
transmitter. At the same time, the relay receiver is interfered by the inter-relay interference from the
transmitting relay. This is similar to the self-interference of full-duplex relay where the transmission
from the transmitting antenna interferes the received signal at the receiving antenna. However, the
interference mitigation technique of TPSR is simpler than the full-duplex relay since the two relays are
physically distributed. The inter-relay interference can be mitigated to the noise floor when the two
relays are sufficiently apart [30].
Let yri (t), i ∈ {1, 2}, yd(t) and ye(t) be the received signals in time slot t at Ri, D and E, respectively.
Assume that the relays, destination and eavesdropper can always decode the data. The received
signals are
yri (t) =
√
P hSRi xs(t) +
√
P hRR xs(t− 1) + nri (t) (1)
yd(t) =
√
P hRiD xs(t− 1) + nd(t) (2)
ye(t) =
√
P hSE xs(t) +
√
P hRiE xs(t− 1) + ne(t) (3)
where hRR is the reciprocal inter-relay channel coefficient.
2.3. Achievable Secrecy Rates
From Equations (1) and (2), the channel capacities for S-to-Ri and Ri-to-D are given by
Csri =
1
2
log
2
(
1+
P
∣∣hSRi ∣∣2
P |hRR|2 + σ2ri
)
(4)
Crid =
1
2
log2
(
1+
P
∣∣hRiD∣∣2
σ2d
)
(5)
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respectively. The data transmission rate for Ri assisted link is
CRi = min
(
Csri , Crid
)
(6)
On the other hand, the eavesdropper can receive xs(t) from S and Ri at time slot t and t + 1
respectively as specified in Equation (3). By assuming that the eavesdropper is able to jointly decode
the information symbols from S and Ri, the instantaneous eavesdropping rate (with the use of
instantaneous eavesdropping rate, the near-far effect when eavesdropper is located closer to R1
than R2 can be readily captured by the equation) for Ri assisted link can be obtained as
Cei =
1
2
log
2
(
1+
P |hSE|2 + P
∣∣hRiE∣∣2
σ2e
)
(7)
From Equations (6) and (7), the achievable secrecy rate for Ri assisted link can be obtained as
Csi =
[
CRi − Cei
]+ (8)
where [x]+ = max (x, 0).
In TPSR, the R1 and R2 operate in a time-division mode and forward messages from S to D
successively in turn. The achievable secrecy rate for TPSR is the sum of achievable secrecy rate for R1
and R2 assisted link as follows:
CTPSR = Cs1 + Cs2 (9)
3. Analysis on Intercept Probability
This section provides the intercept probability analysis of the proposed TPSR. Intercept
probability is the probability that the eavesdropper successfully intercepts the transmission signal.
The eavesdropper can intercept the transmission signal when the transmission rate of legitimate
transmission falls below the eavesdropping rate [36].
Theorem 1. Assume that the channel gain,
∣∣hij∣∣2 of each of the channels is independently exponentially
distributed with mean of λij, the intercept probability for Ri assisted link can be obtained as follows:
Pinti = 1+ α exp
(
α+
λsri + λrid
λrrλrid
)
Ei
(
−α− λsri + λrid
λrrλrid
)
(10)
where α =
λsri
λrr (λse+λri e)
and Ei (·) is the exponential integral function, i.e., Ei (−x) = ∫ ∞x −exp (−t) /t dt.
Proof. From Equation (8), the intercept probability for Ri assisted link can be obtained as:
Pinti = Pr (Csi < 0)
= Pr
(
CRi < Cei
)
(11)
where CRi and Cei are the achievable instantaneous transmission and eavesdropping rates for Ri
assisted link in Equations (6) and (7), respectively. By using the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
approximation, i.e., σ2 → 0, the Csri and Crid in Equation (6) can be approximated as follows:
Csri ≈
1
2
log
2
( P ∣∣hSRi ∣∣2
P |hRR|2 + σ2ri
)
(12)
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Crid ≈
1
2
log2
(P ∣∣hRiD∣∣2
σ2d
)
(13)
Then, the CRi can be approximated as follows:
CRi ≈
1
2
min
[
log
2
( P ∣∣hSRi ∣∣2
P |hRR|2 + σ2ri
)
,
(
log2
P
∣∣hRiD∣∣2
σ2d
)]
(14)
On the other hand, because the eavesdropper can receive xs(t) from S and Ri at time slot t and t+ 1
respectively, the instantaneous eavesdropping rate with high SNR approximation can be approximated
as follows:
Cei =
1
2
log
2
(
1+
P |hSE|2 + P
∣∣hRiE∣∣2
σ2e
)
≈ 1
2
log
2
(
P |hSE|2 + P
∣∣hRiE∣∣2
σ2e
)
(15)
by ignoring the interference of simultaneous transmission from the S and Ri. Substituting
Equations (14) and (15) into Equation (11) produces the intercept probability for Ri assisted link
as follows:
Pinti = Pr
{
min
[
log
2
( P ∣∣hSRi ∣∣2
P |hRR|2 + σ2ri
)
, log2
(P ∣∣hRiD∣∣2
σ2d
)]
< log
2
(P |hSE|2 + P ∣∣hRiE∣∣2
σ2e
)}
(16)
From Equation (16), the intercept probability for Ri assisted link can be obtained as follows:
Pinti =
∫ ∞
0
∫ y
0
fX
(
x
)
fY
(
y
)
dx dy
=
∫ ∞
0
fY (y) FX (y) dy (17)
where fX
(
x
)
and fY
(
y
)
are the probability density function (PDF) of X = min
( P∣∣∣hSRi ∣∣∣2
P|hRR |2+σ2ri
,
P|hRiD|2
σ2d
)
and Y =
P|hSE |2+P|hRiE|2
σ2e
, respectively, and FX
(
y
)
is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X.
The fY
(
y
)
and FX
(
y
)
(see [27]) can be obtained as,
fY
(
y
)
=
1
λse + λrie
exp(− y
λse + λrie
) (18)
and
FX
(
y
)
= 1− λsri
λsri + λrry
exp(−y
(
λsri + λrid
)
λsriλrid
) (19)
respectively. By using (3.352.4) in [37], the intercept probability for Ri assisted link in Equation (17) is
solved and shown in Equation (10).
Remark 1 (Remark of Theorem 1). Theorem 1 shows the closed form intercept probability for Ri assisted
link in TPSR. From Equation (10), the interception probability for Ri assisted link varies with the mean of
corresponding channel gain, i.e., λij. By having higher λsri and λrid for hSRi and hRiD, respectively, the
interception probability for Ri assisted link is decreased. On the other hand, the λrr , λse and λrie for hRR, hSE
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and hRiE, respectively, are the degrading factors, which increases the probability of eavesdropper to intercept the
transmission signal.
Corollary 2. Intercept probability of TPSR is lower bounded by
PTPSR−L = Pint1Pint2
= Pr (Cs1 < 0)Pr (Cs2 < 0) (20)
Proof. The intercept probability of TPSR is
PTPSR = Pr (CTPSR < 0) (21)
where CTPSR = Cs1 + Cs2 . The closed form of PTPSR is not achievable due to complexity of derivation.
Alternately, lower bound of PTPSR can be obtained based on Theorem 1. Theorem 1 shows the closed
form intercept probability for R1 and R2 assisted links in TPSR. The transmission and reception of R1
and R2 are mutually independent. Thus, the lower bound intercept probability of TPSR, PTPSR−L is the
product of intercept probability for R1 and R2 assisted link as shown in Equation (20).
Remark 2 (Remark of Corollary 1). Corollary 1 in Equation (20) shows that intercept probability of TPSR
is lower bounded by the product of intercept probability for R1 and R2 assisted link. Meanwhile, the intercept
probability of full-duplex relaying (FDR) is the intercept probability for a full-duplex relay (FR) assisted link as
shown in Equation (26). Equations (20) and (26) reveal that the lower bound intercept probability of TPSR is
quadratically lower than the FDR. This is because of the two mutually independent assisted link of R1 and R2
in TPSR.
4. Comparable Schemes
In this section, we review the achievable secrecy rate of half-duplex, full-duplex and full-duplex
jamming secrecy network in [27].
4.1. Secrecy Half-Duplex Relaying Network
Half-duplex relaying (HDR) is a conventional relay scheme with a half-duplex relay, R. In the
HDR scheme, S transmits xs(t) to R in time-slot t and R forwards xs(t) to D in subsequent time-slot.
During the transmission, E receives xs(t) twice, from S and R at time slot t and t− 1, respectively.
The data transmission rate for HDR is
CR =
1
2
min
[
log
2
(
1+
P |hSR|2
σ2r
)
, log
2
(
1+
P |hRD|2
σ2d
)]
(22)
On the other hand, the eavesdropping rate can be obtained as
Ce =
1
2
log
2
(
1+
P |hSE|2 + P |hRE|2
σ2e
)
(23)
Then, the achievable secrecy rate of HDR is given by
CHDR = [CR − Ce]+ (24)
4.2. Secrecy Full-Duplex Relaying Network
The system model of full-duplex secrecy relay network in [27] is similar to the half-duplex secrecy
relay network, except now the relay has two antennas for simultaneous receiving and transmission
respectively, i.e., full-duplex relay, FR. With the two antennas, FR can receive xs(t) from S and forward
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the previously decoded xs(t− 1) to D simultaneously at time slot t. Therefore, S and D can transmit
and receive continuously. However, when FR is receiving xs(t) from S, it is interfered by its own
transmission known as self-interference.
The data transmission rate and eavesdropping rate for full-duplex relaying (FDR) are two times
of Equations (6) and (7) respectively and hRR is the self-interference channel coefficient of FR. Then,
the achievable secrecy rate of FDR is given by
CFDR =
[
min
(
2Csri , 2Crid
)− 1
T
log
2
(
det
{
I + HHe He
})]+
(25)
Based on the intercept probability analysis in Section 3, the interception probability of FDR is the
same as the intercept probability of R1 or R2 assisted link in TPSR as follows (see Equation (10))
PFDR = Pinti
= Pr (Csi < 0) (26)
4.3. Secrecy Full-Duplex Jamming Network
The full-duplex jamming (FDJ) network is proposed in [27]. During time slot t, S transmits xs(t)
to FR and FR receives and decodes xs(t) from S while transmitting a jamming signal to E. During time
slot t+ 1, FR forwards previously decoded xs(t) to D and switches off its receiving antenna. At the
same time, S transmits jamming signal to E.
The data transmission rate for FDJ is given in Equation (6) and hRR is the self-interference channel
coefficient of FR. On the other hand, the eavesdropping rate for FDJ is given by
Ce =
1
2
log
2
(1+
P |hSE|2
P |hRE|2 + σ2e
+
P |hRE|2
P |hSE|2 + σ2e
) (27)
Then, the achievable secrecy rate of FDJ can be obtained as
CFDJ =
[
min
(
Csri , Crid
)− Ce]+ (28)
5. Numerical Results
In this section, several Monte Carlo simulation results of the proposed two-path successive
relaying (TPSR) and existing half-duplex relaying (HDR), full-duplex relaying (FDR) and full-duplex
jamming (FDJ) schemes are presented. In the simulations, the transmit power of source and relay,
P is fixed to unity and the SNR for channel from node i to node j is defined as γij = 1/σ
2
j . There are
T = 1000 independent codewords transmitted from the source in all schemes. In this paper, we assume
that the self-interference is the residual self-interference [27] after the self-interference suppression,
which has the same level as the receiver noise. For fair comparison, we assume that the inter-relay
interference is at noise level, which can be achieved through physical separation between the relays,
relay selection, other techniques, etc.
Figure 2 shows the ergodic achievable secrecy rate versus SNR of various schemes when γsr = γrd,
γse = γre = 10 dB and the inter-relay interference or residual self-interference, γrr = 0 dB. It is
obvious that TPSR and FDR achieved the same ergodic achievable secrecy rate. This means that the
TPSR has the same bandwidth efficiency as the FDR. The TPSR and FDR also achieved 95.4 % and
63.3 % ergodic secrecy rate gain compared to HDR and FDJ, respectively, when SNR = 40 dB. This is
because the higher bandwidth efficiency of TPSR and FDR compared to the HDR and FDJ. The FDJ
employs jamming technique to interfere the eavesdropper. As a result, the FDJ achieves higher ergodic
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achievable secrecy rate than the HDR. However, FDJ achieves a lower ergodic achievable secrecy rate
than TPSR and FDR because half of the bandwidth is used to transmit jamming signals.
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Figure 2. Ergodic achievable secrecy rate versus SNR where γsr = γrd, γse = γre = 10 dB and the
inter-relay interference or self-interference, γrr = 0 dB.
Figure 3 shows the intercept probability of various schemes versus SNR when γsr = γrd,
γse = γre = 10 dB and the inter-relay interference or residual self-interference, γrr = 0 dB. We observe
that the FDR has higher probability of interception compared to the HDR. This is because of the residual
self-interference of full-duplex relay in FDR. By transmitting jamming signal to the eavesdropper,
the FDJ achieves lower probability of interception compared to the FDR and HDR. The intercept
probability of TPSR is lower bounded by theoretical result. Meanwhile, the theoretical result of FDR
are well matched to the simulation result. This verifies that the lower bound intercept probability of
TPSR and FDR in Equations (20) and (26), respectively. TPSR also achieves the lowest probability of
interception compared to all the other schemes at high SNR, i.e., SNR ≥ 30 dB. This is because the
two mutually independent assisted link of R1 and R2 contribute lower intercept probability to the
TPSR compared to the other schemes equipped with only one relay.
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Figure 3. Intercept probability versus SNR where γsr = γrd, γse = γre = 10 dB and the inter-relay
interference or self-interference, γrr = 0 dB.
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Figure 4 shows the intercept probability versus inter-relay interference or residual self-interference,
γrr for various schemes when γsr = γrd = 40 dB and γse = γre = 10 dB. The FDR has the highest
probability of interception compared to the other schemes even when γrr = 0 dB. The residual
self-interference decreases the data transmission rate of the FDR. Therefore, the FDR has higher
probability of interception compared to the HDR. However, by employing jamming technique, the FDJ
with low residual self-interference can achieve lower probability of interception compared to the HDR.
On the other hand, when the inter-relay interference γrr < 15 dB, the TPSR has the lowest probability of
interception compared to the other schemes. This shows that the operating requirement for inter-relay
interference level in TPSR is much lower and practical if compared to the self interference level in FDR.
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Figure 4. Intercept probability versus inter-relay interference or residual self-interference, γrr where
γsr = γrd = 40 dB and γse = γre = 10 dB.
Figure 5 shows the secrecy outage probability versus target secrecy rate, r of various schemes
when γsr = γrd = 40 dB, γse = γre = 10 dB and the inter-relay interference or residual self-interference,
γrr = 0 dB. The probability of secrecy outage of all the schemes is increasing when the target secrecy
rate, r is increased. The TPSR has the lowest probability of secrecy outage compared to the other
schemes and it is lower bounded by the FDR. This is due to the use of two relays in TPSR which
provide additional diversity and full-duplex bandwidth efficiency. In contrast to previous results
in Figure 3, where the FDR has lower probability of secrecy outage than the HDR and FDJ. This is
because the “1/2” pre-log factor in achievable secrecy rate of HDR and FDJ in Equations (24) and (28).
The jamming technique benefits the FDJ by delivering lower probability of secrecy outage than HDR.
Figure 6 shows the secrecy outage probability versus inter-relay interference or self-interference,
γrr for various schemes when target secrecy rate, r = 2 bits/s/Hz, γse = γre = 10 dB and
γsr = γrd = 40 dB. The TPSR has the lowest probability of secrecy outage compared to the FDR
and FDJ. In other words, with the same γrr, TPSR is more secure than the FDR and FDJ. By considering
the HDR as baseline scheme, when γrr = 10 dB, the TPSR has lower probability of secrecy outage,
whereas the FDR and FDJ have higher probability of secrecy outage. This shows that the FDR and FDJ
require much lower γrr compared to the TPSR to achieve lower probability of secrecy outage than the
HDR. As a result, the FDR and FDJ have a stricter requirement on residual interference compared to
the TPSR.
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Figure 6. Outage probability versus inter-relay interference or self-interference, γrr where target secrecy
rate, r = 2 bits/s/Hz, γse = γre = 10 dB and γsr = γrd = 40 dB.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, two-path successive relaying (TPSR) is proposed to improve the security of wireless
transmission. We compare the ergodic achievable secrecy rate, interception probability and secrecy
outage probability of the proposed TPSR against the existing half-duplex relaying (HDR), full-duplex
relaying (FDR) and full-duplex jamming (FDJ). The numerical results reveal that the proposed TPSR
achieves the same ergodic achievable secrecy rate as the FDR. The TPSR also delivers the lowest
probability of interception and secrecy outage compared to the other schemes due to the full-duplex
bandwidth efficiency and the two mutually independent links assisted by relay pair R1 and R2.
The intercept probabilities of TPSR and FDR are analyzed and verified with simulation. The analysis
shows that the intercept probability of TPSR is quadratically lower than the intercept probability of
FDR. The numerical results show the TPSR has the lowest probability of interception compared to all
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other schemes when the inter-relay interference, γrr < 15 dB. In terms of secrecy outage probability,
the FDR and FDJ demand lower interference level compared to the TPSR in order to outperform the
HDR. In short, with the proposed TPSR protocol, a secured wireless transmission can be achieved by
using conventional half-duplex relays without employing sophisticated jamming and/or interference
cancellation techniques.
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